

THE BATTLE REPORT

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AN ORAL HISTORY NEWSLETTER


THE KOREAN WAR BATTLE REPORT



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Notes From The Editor

I want to take this opportunity to apologize to **Bob Hall** for calling him "**Bill**," not that being called "**Bill**" is an insult, but we ought to be able to get and keep names straight. I guess I am just influenced by all the "**Billy Bobs**" down South here. Never heard of a "**Bobby Bill**," come to think of it.

For those of you who were in the Brigade, please note that the second **First Provisional Marine Brigade Muster (Convention)** will be in **San Antonio September 27-29 at the El Tropicana Hotel**. \$20 registration, \$25 banquet dinner, \$50 per room, single or double, includes breakfast buffet and free parking. Suggested air travel is by Southwest Air Line if they serve your area. Register by mailing \$20 to **1st Brigade Committee at P.O. Box 530322, Austin, TX 78753-0322**, state room requirements and registration forms will be sent. Only **300 rooms** reserved at this point.

Also note the **Chosin Few** convention will be in **Las Vegas** in November. contact them, if you are a member or wish to join.

Tom Gregory had his **Southeastern Few** meeting at **Beaufort, S.C.** April 26th. I haven't had a report on it at this writing, since it is still a few weeks in the future but will have occurred by the time you get this.

As you may have gathered by now, we have got this system working and the newsletters are getting out in better time. Unfortunately, the Post Office has decided to increase the postage costs and that puts us in a bind. We have decided that if this continues into volume 2, starting with the September 1990 issue we will charge \$15 for First Class mail and \$12.50 for 3rd class. The problem with 3rd class is they won't forward it and they won't let us know it didn't arrive. But it costs us 65 cents to mail 1st class and 25 cents 3rd class under the new rates. So we will have to pass it on. Hope you understand. In any event, the continuation will depend on how many more sign on. We are in hopes of picking up a good many more from a recent ad mail out we sent to 7000. If it works out we will have enough to pay the freight for another year.

I have been in hopes that **SOME** one of you might write a short note on some of this history we have been covering. surely someone remembers something different than the official history reports. There are errors in some of these things. Sometimes it's an over-enthusiastic observer, sometimes it is the politics of the day. If you remember it differently, let us have your remembrance.

One of the reasons I have felt that **Bob Hall's Letters** were so useful, not only are they well written, they cover things that the history books never touch, yet these are the types of things that give flavor and color to the official history.

I am glad that we were able to find the **DARKHORSE** article by **Taplett** because there is another story that is barely covered in the official history, and it is an important story. The breakout from **Chosin** involved in very important ways men and units that were barely mentioned in the books.


This is really my hope, that we can get more of these type stories to add color and widen the scope of reporting on what actually did happen. For every medal awarded for heroism in the Korean War, there were hundreds of other men who did as much, yet were not recognized because of where they were or in some instances there was no one left to report it.

Today the Army is awarding the Purple Heart for heat exhaustion in the Panama incident. They awarded it for frost-bite in Korea, and everyone gave everyone a medal in Grenada. Medals dont tell the whole story!

Personally, after reading **DARKHORSE**, I am of the opinion there are a few more **CMOHs** due, especially to **Bob Taplett**. It's a little spooky to think about how many lives depended on so few men, the right ones in the right place at the right time. **O.P. Smith, Murray, Taplett, Davis, Puller, Litzenberger**, just to name the top ranks.

Most of you have received issues numbered 3 thru 8 recently, all in one package. My apologies again for the delay, but it'll keep you reading through the summer until the September issue, which will be Volume 2 number 1. If you have any comments, I am always glad to hear them, good or bad.

"DARKHORSE"



DARKHORSE

Continued from Vol. 1 number 8

THE STORY OF "DARKHORSE"

LtCol Robert Taplett USMC

All units of Darkhorse were now on a fifty percent alert. The battalion communications officer, Lt Hercules Kelley, started a wire team laying wire from H/5 to H/7 in order to tie them into the 3/5 communication system. Thereafter, except for occasional casualties coming off 1402 and occasional small-arms fire, the area remained ominously quiet. H and I Companies were alerted to be especially cautious in taking unidentified persons under fire because of stragglers and casualties coming off Hill 1402.

Just before midnight H/5 spotted enemy troops approaching along the lower slopes of Hill 1402 on their right flank and obviously taking cover and concealment in and around native huts at the base of the hill about a hundred yards to their front. They took them under fire with small arms and automatic weapons and requested the 75mm recoilless gun platoon (attached to 3/5 to cover tank approaches from the north and west) to fire into the huts. This set them on fire and the Chinese began running in all directions. It turned out to be a turkeyshoot for members of H/5. The burning buildings lit up the whole area and the Chinese could be spotted and shot the minute they began to move. Chinese casualties were very high while the only casualties in How Company for the night were from frostbite.

Not long after the turkeyshoot, the platoon leader of the first platoon, H/5, Lt Williams, was sitting in the warmup tent which had been set up in his area. He was looking at the top of the

tent and commenting that it was getting holes in it from being bounced around in the jeep. As he watched, the number of holes increased. There was little time lost in getting out and into defensive positions. H Company was not under attack, but shots from the enemy located on the high ground above the battalion CP were falling in their area.

Marines of the third platoon of H/5, located just west of the stream which ran along the MSR, threw grenades into the stream from time to time to keep the icy water flowing. They were making sure that any attempt by the enemy to penetrate their position would be preceded by an icewater bath.

Other units of 3/5 did not fare quite so well as Capt Williamson's How Company on this particular night. The short respite and the elation over H/5's turkeyshoot were shortlived. At 0115 the Weapons Company outpost, located several hundred yards up the draw to the northeast of the CP area, fired on a small enemy group approaching its position along the ridge from the north. They killed one and definitely identified him as a Chinese soldier. The others withdrew without returning the fire. Shortly after, Item Company and the Wharang platoon reported small-arms fire coming into their area again.

In the meantime the wire line to the remaining elements of H/7 had been laid and communications established with 3/5. H Co, 7th Marines reported heavy enemy troop movements around their right flank, apparently an effort to cut the MSR behind H/7 and 2/5. This report was shortly verified by 1/5 who also reported many enemy troops moving toward its sector from the northwest. After withdrawing the company outpost, I Company took

these troops under fire. The enemy was dispersed and discouraged to the extent that the center and left flank platoons were not again bothered during the night. The enemy did not quit, however, and he was apparently determined to cut the MSR. Shortly after Item Company had dispersed the force approaching along the corridor floor, the enemy launched a strong attack along the ridge to the right of the command post against the 2d platoon of I Company and the Wharang platoon. Well after dark the 2d platoon of Item Company had been moved to outpost the ridge forward of the Wharang platoon.

This was necessary because it was learned that D and E Companies of the 7th RCT were not occupying the high ground forward of 3/5 as previously reported. After placing his squads in position the platoon leader crawled into his sleeping bag and was talking to the company commander on the phone when he noticed five or six figures creeping up over the side of the spur. He paused, thinking they were his own men. The hesitation was only momentary before he realized it was the enemy. He hopped up and grabbed his carbine and tried to fire. It was frozen! In stocking feet with a useless frozen carbine in hand he made a dash to the rear where he had placed one of his machine guns. Fortunately, when he jumped up he startled the enemy troops and instead of firing they ducked back into the trees. Shortly after, there were two enemy whistle blasts which brought an estimated two companies of Chinese screaming and firing from both sides of the spur.

Instead of coming down the crest of the spur, they had filtered down either side and bypassed the squad which was placed forward as the pla-

toon point. Then on signal they attacked from either side up over the crest. They caught the 2d platoon completely unawares except for the forward squad which had been bypassed. The enemy then quickly overran the remaining elements of the platoon and charged headlong into the Wharang platoon on the extension of the ridge immediately above the CP.

In the course of the first enemy thrust, one of the 2d platoon Marines was knocked bodily off the steep ridge line and actually rolled head over heels down the slope into the Weapons Company position. An interrogation of the man revealed only that there were plenty of Chinese coming down the ridge. The Wharangs caught the full thrust of the assault, and though overrun, the heroic self-sacrifice of their machine gun section (4 killed) furnished the short delay needed by the CP to organize its defense. By the time the CCF reached the command post, H&S was ready for the attack. The H&S Company commander and the Bn Exec had placed every available man and officer in the CP into firing positions. For a short interval, the attack forced the right flank of H&S back about a hundred yards to the MSR, leaving a large gap between the CP and Weapons Company to the right. Certain command installations were left temporarily uncovered in this "no-man's land."

It was during this period that the Chinese managed to roll grenades into the communications tent and knock out the switchboard, temporarily cutting all wire communications and wounding the switchboard operator. For a period, the communications officer, sliding back and forth on his belly between the communications tent and the blackout tent, provided the only contact between the CO and the

switchboard.

The Bn CO remained in the operations tent with the S-3 and continued to maintain radio communications and readied George Company for the counter-attack. The Exec and other staff officers and NCOs in the CP rallied H&S personnel who retook their previous positions, restoring the right flank and reestablishing contact with Weapons Company. The wire section worked feverishly to reestablish wire communications.

The S-3, working with the CO in the operations tent, stood with pistol in hand cocked and ready throughout this entire period. Slugs and several fragments from grenades went through the tent but no Chinese got to it, thanks to the accurate shooting of Pfc Swenson, the CO's radio "packhorse." A good thing it was, because the operations officer's pistol had frozen in the sub-zero weather and couldn't have been fired.

There were many casualties on both sides including the Bn Exec, Maj Carney, who was killed before the attack was contained. G Company was able to counterattack at about 0400 and drive the enemy back up over the spur. The counterattack was swift and effective. With two platoons abreast, the company moved up through the CP and on to the spur. The second platoon commanded by Lt Cahill took the left side of the spur, and the third platoon commanded by Lt Cashion took the right side of the spur. Casualties were high but within an hour they had retaken the spur and pushed beyond the original positions occupied by the 2d platoon of Item Company.

At daybreak, the positions initially occupied by 3/5 were intact. The

only area which had been seriously threatened was the spur above the command post which had been occupied by the right flank platoon of Item Company and the Wharang platoon. This position, overrun by the CCF, had been retaken by G Company.

At about 0730 on the morning of 28 November, a group of approximately ninety CCF troops approached G Co from the northeast. The 3d platoon took this force under fire and the enemy withdrew. After this there was a period of relative quiet in the 3/5 area. The members of Darkhorse had a chance to appraise their situation and lick wounds. How Company had suffered no casualties other than frostbite. Item Company had suffered casualties, mostly from the 2d platoon which had been overrun. H&S Company suffered many casualties, including the Bn Exec. The Wharang platoon lost fifteen men, four killed and eleven wounded. George Company had many casualties during the night. Although many of their losses occurred during the counter-attack, including the platoon leader of the 3d platoon, Lt Cashion, there were more George members put out of action by the subzero weather than by enemy bullets. Excess clothing had been laid aside to facilitate ease of movement during the counter-attack. When the objective was taken and additional clothing was needed it was not quickly available.

HILL 1402, which had been occupied by H/7, was now in the hands of the CCF troops. From this hill the enemy had an excellent view of the positions and movements of the various units in 3/5. Although orders still required continuance of the attack to the west the Marines somehow felt that they had come to a definite and abrupt halt. During the night the enemy forces

had moved into the Chosin Reservoir area in strength and completely surrounded the Marines. The Chinese had struck in force all along the MSR from Yudamni to Hagaru. They had wiped out many small Marine outposts and occupied key terrain features. They had isolated F/7 in the Toktong Pass and C/7 three or four miles south of Yudam-ni. The tactical air observer for the division had definitely located and reported seven physical roadblocks established by the enemy between the Marine position south of Yudam-ni and the Toktong Pass area.

In addition to learning something about the enemy during the night, the Marines learned a lot about cold weather mountain warfare. From experience they had learned that care had to be exercised in the manner of dress and the necessity of changing socks periodically to prevent frostbite. They had learned that weapons had to be kept dry and free from oil so that they would not freeze. When a lubricant was needed, nothing heavier than a little shaving lotion was required. This was especially true of the carbines and pistols which more often failed to fire in the cold weather than did the M1s and automatic weapons.

The long-awaited daylight brought little comfort to the Marines in the Yudam-ni area. As the full impact of the night's fighting became known, the CO of RCT7, Col Litzenberg, and the CO of RCT5, LtCol Murray, decided that the attack to the west could not be continued. They agreed that it was necessary to consolidate, reorganize, and establish a joint defense perimeter for mutual protection and to provide for a coordinated effort against this new and overwhelming force which surrounded them. During this consolidation the battalions of RCT5 were to

redeploy so that the 5th RCT held the north and west sector above Yudam-ni, and RCT7 the south and east sector below Yudamni. The 2d Bn, 5th Marines was withdrawn into the new perimeter to a position on the high ground west and south of the village of Yudam-ni. The 1st Bn occupied the high ground to the northeast and 3/5 the high ground north and west. Darkhorse was to hold the north and northwest rim of the perimeter, particularly the key terrain feature, Hill 1282. It was here that the CCF were exerting the heaviest pressure.

During the morning of 28 November, all units of the battalion were ordered to new defense positions as part of the plan to relieve all of the 7th Marine elements north and west of Yudam-ni. H Company relieved G Company and occupied a position on the ridge where the battle had raged the preceding night. Their position extended over toward Hill 1282 which was occupied by Capt Schrier's Item Company, George Company, a team of engineers, and the 75mm recoilless gun platoon organized defense positions across the valley floor from How Company to the 2/5 position to the south. A roadblock was established west of the battalion CP. George Company was designated as the reserve. Weapons Company and H&S were placed on the low ground astride the MSR east of the George Company position.

Item Company completed the relief of remaining remnants of E/7, A/5, and C/5 on the reverse slope of Hill 1282, with the exception of one platoon of 1/5 on the right shoulder of the hill. (A and C Companies had been sent to reinforce the position on Hill 1282 during the night). Shortly after Item had effected the relief and was at-

tempting to improve the position, it found itself under Chinese observation and was subjected to heavy small-arms, grenade, and mortar fire. Although the enemy made no determined attempt to attack, I Company remained in close contact and repelled minor probing actions.

H Company in turn received sporadic rifle and long range machinegun fire from the Chinese position on Hill 1384. Except for the "hotspot" on 1282, there were no concerted attacks against 3/5 positions.

Early in the morning of the 29th, the 3/5 roadblock covering the corridors leading into Yudam-ni from the northwest and west reported an estimated sixty CCF approaching down the northwest corridor to the left front of How Company. A short time later another group of Chinese started down the draw between H and I Companies and made a thrust into the 2d platoon position of How Company. The enemy had come by a listening post which had been established to warn the company of any enemy approach. Marines at the listening post heard the enemy all right, but in the darkness they lost their way back and the enemy arrived ahead of them. The enemy approached the position within challenging distance before being recognized. The men in one of the machinegun sections, thinking it was the outpost returning, let one of the enemy get into their position and actually hit one of the members on the head.

No other Marine was hit, however, nor did the enemy get any closer for in the gray light of dawn the platoon took a toll of eighteen Chinese killed and three captured. The enemy was repulsed and the 3/5 area was again quiet except for small-arms fire.

Between eleven and twelve o'clock two enemy attacks were made on the Item Company positions by a force estimated at two companies. Still a third attack came at about 1400. The latter attack apparently was coordinated with an attack on B/5 on Hill 1260. All of these attacks were repulsed with the support of mortar fire and air strikes. The position was awkward to hold because it was necessary to remain on the reverse side of the slope. The high ground in the foreground occupied by the enemy made it impossible to move up on top of the ridge or to the forward slope.

Neither could an attack be made to drive the enemy from the higher ground because it would extend the lines of 3/5 too far and serve no tactical purpose. The enemy, on the other hand, couldn't turn I Co's left as How would bring them under fire, and B/5 on 1260 covered the right flank. Thus the position became stalemated. The Marines could not afford to drive the enemy from the high ground to their front and the enemy was not capable of driving the Marines from the ridge below, which overlooked the MSR. The enemy could move an attack force down to the ridge by covering it with fire from the high ground, but the attack force could not move over the top of Hill or around it without coming under the grazing fire of the Marines. Thus the chief infantry weapon was the grenade which the enemy and the Marines threw back and forth at each other over the crest of the ridge.

During the enemy attack on the I Company position the morning of the 29th of November, over one thousand grenades were used in the period of about one hour. The battalion S-4, 1stLt J.A. Wachter, (also doing the job of the supply officer who had been

wounded) had a difficult time getting grenades in quantity to keep Item Company supplied. The grenades in the battalion supply dump were exhausted and collections had to be made from G and H Companies for delivery to I Company.

When air strikes were called against the enemy attack force, they were made with the planes flying directly toward Item's position. This was one of the few times in the history of warfare that air strikes were made effectively and safely against the enemy while flying into and over friendly forces. Most of the enemy casualties resulted from the air strikes and grenades. In the few instances the enemy reached the crest of the hill, he was brought down by rifle and automatic weapons fire.

By now the strength of 3/5 had dwindled considerably. It had been in good shape when the action started, but by now the bitter cold and the heavy fighting had collaborated in causing the casualties that thinned the ranks. George and Item Companies had been hit the hardest, which was to be expected after reviewing the firefights they had both been through.

The weather and the enemy kept chipping away at the Marines, causing more casualties and forcing them to expend critical supplies. Our combat strength and effectiveness were lessened as each day passed. In all effort to strengthen the rifle units the two regimental commanders organized provisional rifle platoons from the artillery, engineers, and H&S units.

C Btry, 1/11 provided a provisional platoon (thirty-nine men and one officer) under the command of 1stLt Doris Booker, which was assigned to Item

Company. A Btry, 1/11 provided one platoon (forty men and one officer) under the command of Lt Kellett, which was assigned to George Company. How Company, which had the fewest casualties, received no replacements at this time. There had been little activity in the H Company area except for the attack early in the morning which was repulsed.

Except for the close contact with the CCF in the sectors of Item Company and its neighbor, B/5 to the east, the night of 29-30 November passed with no concerted activity elsewhere in the RCT-5 area other than the usual small-arms fire and occasional inaccurate light mortar fire.

Marine Air played a vital role as it continued to work over the Chinese positions immediately forward of Item and Baker Companies until darkness forced the planes to return to their bases.

It was a gloomy picture for Darkhorse and other elements of RCTs 5 and 7. The 7th RCT in its attempt to clear the MSR from Yudam-ni to Hagaru had been completely unsuccessful, and the battalion attempting the breakout had been withdrawn when faced with encirclement by the CCF. By now it was known that seven physical roadblocks existed, one of which included an all important bridge which had been destroyed. This bridge not only would have to be secured, but also would have to be repaired by the small detachment of engineers to permit vehicles and equipment to accompany the troops in the breakout.

Just after daybreak on the morning of the 30th, the weary, half-frozen Marines in I Company came under another heavy enemy attack. The

planned relief of Item by George Company was temporarily held up due to this attack. Although coordinated enemy pressure was brought to bear against B/5, the primary effort appeared again to be directed at Hill 1282. With heavy close air support and excellent mortar fire from Lt House's mortar platoon, the attack was halted although the enemy remained well entrenched over the crest in front of the Item position.

As the attack subsided, G Company proceeded to the relief of I Company, commencing at 0915. This relief was exceptionally difficult and was hampered by light attacks, consequently it was not completed until around 1300. Item Company had fought at close quarters with the Chinese for over two days with no sleep and frozen rations which were in short supply. To hold the vital hill against the CCF, relatively fresh troops were required and the dependable "Firehorse," George Company, drew the role.

Just after G Co had occupied the ridge, the enemy launched another attack concentrated on the right flank. The platoon leader of the right flank platoon, Lt Price, (a replacement sent from the regimental S-4 section), and Platoon Sergeant Golbert were killed. The platoon guide and two squad leaders were wounded. The platoon runner, Pfc Edmund Orsulak and a BAR man, Pfc David Alley, rallied the men on the right flank and held the line. Orsulak filled the job of the platoon sergeant and moved about the platoon position giving encouragement to the men and directing the fire.

Alley assumed command of his squad when the squad leader was killed. He repositioned his men so they could deliver the most effective fire and

kept them supplied with ammunition and grenades. Casualties were high on the right flank and little was left of the first platoon, but by 1600 with the help of air, artillery, and mortar fire the attack was contained.

Early on 1 December the two RCT commanders decided to execute their joint plan for the attack to Hagaru. Speed was now of the essence as time ran in favor of the Chinese who continued to multiply while the strength and will and determination of the Marines ebbed. Breaking out of the Yudamni area with two RCTs and closing on Hagaru would be the first and most difficult phase of the division's fight to Hungnam. The Chinese had concentrated strong forces along the MSR, especially between Yudam-ni and Hagaru, and the Marines in turn needed the route desperately if they were to come out with their equipment, vital supplies, wounded, and dead.

Darkhorse, occupying the north and northwest rim of the perimeter, was ordered to break contact, disengage, and then move to relieve the 1st Bn, 7th Marines occupying positions on the ridge south of Yudam-ni and along the lower western perimeter. The relief was to be effected as soon as possible on 1 December, so that 1/7 could be used to execute a wide envelopment overland through the mountains to the southeast to join and reinforce Fox Company, 2/7 which had been holding Toktong Pass. F/7 had been isolated and surrounded there since the night of 27/28 November. The 1st Bn, 7th Marines and F/7 were to hold Toktong Pass until a juncture could be made by the force attacking astride the MSR.

Early on the morning of 1 December, 3/5 commenced to disengage and withdraw. The initial phase of the ma-

neuver, the withdrawal of H & I Co's, was relatively simple. The position George Company occupied had been under constant enemy pressure since the night of 27/28 November. The fighting had been so intense and fierce that it had become primarily a battle of hand grenades. The battalion S-4 had long since lost count of grenades sent to the defenders of 1282. By now G Company was well entrenched high on the reverse crest of the ridge and the CCFs were stubbornly dug in on the forward crest.

To permit G Company to disengage from the enemy at such close contact without a heavy loss in casualties and without allowing the Chinese to attack over the crest and pursue the Marines down the rugged slopes, 3/5 neatly executed the disengagement under the cover of all supporting fires that could be mustered. It was accomplished by split-second timing of the air strikes and artillery fires with the maneuver of G Company. Because of the close-in disposition of the enemy facing George Company, there was considerable concern over the air strikes, since to do the job they would have to be so close they might endanger the Marines.

To insure the defenders of 1282 a chance to commence their move, Lt Greene, the FAC, decided to employ a familiar ruse, the "dummy run," to keep the Chinese down. He coordinated his plans with the artillery liaison officer, Lt Ammer, who was calling in the artillery fire. The G Co commander, Capt Hermanson, was directed to commence his withdrawal as soon as the first Corsairs made their pass over the target and to signal as soon as his troops were able to move out of the line of the strafing attacks. The FAC on receipt of this signal called in the live runs and plastered the crest and the

forward slope of the hill with rockets, bombs, napalm, and 20mm shells. Lt Ammer, working elbow to elbow with the FAC, called in the artillery while the last plane was in its dive. In addition to this, all ammunition which could not be carried from the lines by George Company was thrown into foxholes along the front of the company position and touched off by throwing thermite grenades into the holes. The ridge appeared to disappear completely. Under cover of this tremendous bombardment the G Company Firehorses disengaged quickly and without a single casualty. The pilots orbiting overhead reported that the Chinese who were still alive were hurriedly scurrying down the forward slope and running north. Long after G Co had pulled off 1282 the Chinese continued to throw mortar fire at the ridge.

While the bombardment was going on B/5 was withdrawing from Hill 1260 southeast across the valley floor. Yudam-ni had been set afire and was smoking ruins too hot for the Chinese to occupy after the Marines' withdrawal. The bridge south of Yudamni was destroyed by the engineers as the last radio vehicle from 3/5 passed over.

The relief of the 1st Bn, 7th Marines, by the 3d Bn, 5th Marines, (directed by the joint operations order issued by the COs of RCTs-5 and 7) was proceeding smoothly and was about fifty percent completed when the mission was changed. Darkhorse, the last unit to leave Yudamni, was now to spearhead the attack along the main supply route for both RCTs.

As the men of 3/5 moved down the MSR and through the joint command post of the two regimental combat teams, everything appeared con-

fused and disorganized because of the tremendous activity. Regimental aid stations were loaded with casualties, and the road was clogged with personnel and vehicles of the entire force.

The 3d Bn, 7th Marines had started the attack along the MSR toward Hagaru, but it had not gone well. Little progress had been made and the assigned objective had not been reduced. Assault companies of 3/7 were widely separated on the ridges to the east and west and were beyond mutual support. H/7, attacking Hill 1419 on the west of the MSR, had suffered heavy casualties, and it was obvious that additional strength was needed to overcome the Chinese defenses.

The plan was such that 3/5 would pass through the middle of 3/7's lines in a column of companies. When this was done, Darkhorse would be situated on the immediate right flank of H/7 and could attack along the main supply route to outflank the stubborn resistance on Hill 1419. But nothing was constant. Orders had to be changed rapidly and issued verbally to meet changing circumstances. There was no time available for long or considered planning.

Chinese in overwhelming numbers had moved in along the main supply route and were determined to deny it as an escape route for the Marines. The enemy had occupied all key terrain features from Yudam-ni to Hagaru with the exception of one isolated knoll located many miles down the road at Toktong Pass. Between Yudam-ni and this outpost, held by F/7, there were seven strong enemy roadblocks facing 3/5.

The picture was not bright for Darkhorse and other units of the two

Marine RCTs. Visions of the Yalu River and Christmas at home had long since vanished as the cold, tired, hungry Leathernecks began their fight to break the ring which the enemy had thrown up around them. Then, at long last, the shifting perimeter began stretching southward. The drive to open the MSR, vital to the survival of the beleaguered Marine lines, was starting. The attack along the corridor toward Hagaru had begun.

Darkhorse moved through 3/7's lines at about 1500 on 1 December 1950 in its role as spearhead for the entire force. How Co was in the lead followed by Item and George, with How's second platoon forward and the first and third in support.

One tank, the only one which the division had been able to get through to Yudamni, was assigned to the point, followed by two bulldozers and a small detachment of engineers. The forward position of the bulldozers and engineering personnel was necessary since the narrow road had to be repaired or roadblocks cleared. Also, looking to all possibilities, it would be necessary for the bulldozers to push the tank out of the way should it be knocked out. That tank leading the column, incidentally, was a tremendous morale factor for the Marines and, conversely, demoralizing for the enemy. Although the Chinese positions had to be taken by infantry, it was good to look down on the MSR and see the iron monster. Even the sound, one which only a rumbling tank can make, was reassuring.

After 3/5 had moved rapidly almost three-quarters of a mile, the Chinese opened up on the battalion from the high ground on both sides of the road. Lt Denzil Walden's platoon (2d Plt, C Co) sustained 14 casualties.

and the advance was held up. Capt Schrier, commander of Item Co, and Capt Williamson, skipper of How Co, decided that Item should assault the enemy positions to the left of the MSR and that How should hit those to the right. The battalion commander approved the plan, and H Co moved across the corridor and up the hill. By 1800, How had seized its objective despite enemy rifle fire, but Item, because of heavier resistance, did not reach its objective, the large spur north of Hill 1520, until 1930.

That night the temperature continued to drop until it hit 25 degrees below zero. Assault troops of H and I Cos were heavily spent, with the toll in casualties from the fighting and freezing weather beginning to show. The will to fight remained strong, however, since the initial successes of How and Item Co's had raised spirits and the battalion trains and supplies had forced their way through the clogged road.

H and I Cos were given a brief rest as the battalion consolidated its position before continuing the attack. Although the CO of Darkhorse had misgivings about pressing his assault at night over unfamiliar, precipitous terrain, he calculated that chances of success would be increased for the undersized companies if they moved during darkness. Too long a pause would allow the enemy to recover. Also, if the troops kept moving, even if very slowly, they would stay awake and alert; whereas, if they stopped, many would succumb to sleep and the cold.

So before midnight Item Co moved out from its first objective toward the next high ground, Hill 1520. As the men moved into the draw to their front, a killing crossfire, directed

from both flanks and Hill 1520, hit them. It was a heavy fight and the position was untenable.

Capt Schrier requested permission for his company to return to the initial objective so that he could better defend the MSR, and the CO of 3/5 concurred. Item hastily set up defenses to repel this latest serious threat. The Chinese tactic at this point was to strike, drop back, fire a mortar mission, then withdraw again. Several times this procedure was followed with both Marine and enemy casualties high. Capt Schrier, hit in the neck, wounded for a second time, and too weak to continue to lead his men, refused to be evacuated until he had turned over the remainder of his company to Lt Peterson and had extracted from him the promise he would hold at all costs. The officers and men of Item Co distinguished themselves that night by their leadership, skill in night fighting, and determination to hold their ground.

SSgt William G. Windrich, with a squad, initially held off the enemy attack long enough to permit Item to reorganize. Although he was wounded in the head by a hand grenade, he continued to fight and organized small groups of volunteers to evacuate wounded. Windrich was hit again in the leg during one of the early morning attacks, but he remained in action until he lapsed into unconsciousness and died.

On another sector of the front, TSgt Dale L. Stropes was constantly on the move directing fire and arranging for evacuation of the wounded. He was hit twice himself, but continued with his unit until wounded again by an enemy mortar burst. Early in the morning he was evacuated to the aid station

where he died.

1stLt Dorsie Booker, commanding the provisional artillery platoon which had been attached from C Battery of 1/11, kept his men in position and fighting. He reorganized his platoon following one of the heavy enemy counterattacks and recaptured positions taken by the Chinese, thus stabilizing the company's lines. His leadership was outstanding as he worked and fought with his men for five hours, effectively utilizing the ammunition and weapons of the dead and wounded who had been evacuated, and held the line until he was killed.

Just as Item had jumped off from its first objective shortly before midnight the previous night, communications had gone out and there was no direct contact between the command post and I Co during the darkness hours. Some casualties had arrived at the battalion aid station about midnight, but they had been wounded before the heavy attacks against Item had begun, so there was little knowledge in the CP of the fight going on in the hills to the left flank.

The CO of 3/5 sent runners to contact I Co after his communications failed, but they lost their way and were not seen until the next day. Not until the casualties started to arrive early next morning could an accurate appraisal of the Item situation be made.

The second section of the battalion aid station (a part of the rear echelon of the 3/5 CP consisting of H&S Co and the remaining elements of the battalion transportation, some 20 vehicles with supplies and equipment, had not cleared the 7th Marines lines until 2100, and it was 2300 before the personnel pulled up in position with

the main elements of Darkhorse.

They halted for the night, moving vehicles off the MSR into a rice paddy where they formed a circle similar to those used in the days of the covered wagon for defense against the Indians. In the middle of the circle was a native hut which served as the aid station, later being referred to by 3/5 personnel as "Dante's Inferno."

A few casualties, as has been mentioned, started filtering in soon after the aid station was set up, and by early morning they were arriving in greatly increasing numbers. Seriously wounded personnel were treated and sent back to the regimental aid station, while the walking wounded who could provide security for the battalion train were kept with the main column.

Maj Swain, who had taken Maj Carney's place as executive officer, kept order in and around the aid station, and Chaplain Bernard Hickey performed a Herculean spiritual task among the wounded and dying. The ExO commented that "Chaplain Hickey could not have been replaced except by our Blessed Lord Himself."

While Item had moved out toward its assigned objective the previous night, How Co on the right flank had been advancing simultaneously, receiving some not-too-accurate small arms and automatic weapons fire from the high ground to its right. As the How troops started up the ridge to their front, they could hear the enemy digging in at the top, and the company commander requested permission to occupy a concealed position in some pines on the enemy's flank from which he could attack after an air strike in the morning. Darkhorse's CO approved the plan since the How advance had to

be halted anyway until the Item situation was clarified.

At dawn, H/5 again began to receive small arms and automatic weapons fire from the high ground to its right and right rear. How returned the fire and jumped off, suffering some casualties but moving to within 50 yards of the enemy on top of the hill. Then the planes came.

The air strike was very effective; at times, the rocket and strafing attacks were made within 30 yards of the Marines' own lines. As the last plane struck and gave the familiar wave of its wings, How charged up the hill, and by 1500 had routed the enemy and secured the position. Air strikes kept high ground to the right front neutralized so that H Co could bypass it and move on.

That morning—it was 2 December—George Co counter-attacked through the Item Co lines, encountering some enemy firing small arms and an occasional automatic weapon but finding no strong, well-organized position. Few Chinese were left on the hill which Item had held through the night. Lt Peterson had only 11 men left, but 342 enemy dead were counted in the area as George Co began to move along the left flank of the MSR toward Hill 1520.

On the battalion level, the CO was reorganizing for the push forward. All gear such as tents, stoves, tables, cots, clothing rolls, and the like was ordered burned or destroyed to make room for casualties. Ammunition, fuel, and wounded were the priorities for vehicles.

Both George Co on the left flank and How Co on the right had been reduced to two platoon strength. So,

with the loss of Item Co, 3/5's CO requested another company for support from the regimental commander. The best that could be provided was a composite company made up of remnants of the 7th Marines. This outfit was to move down the road directly behind the tank to parallel G and H Cos in the hills to either flank.

By 1200, George Co had secured Hill 1520 from an estimated 50 to 80 Chinese and the company was cheered by the sight of Marines from 1/7 on the ridges to its left. At first, George personnel thought that the Leatherneck ridgerunners were enemy troops ready to fire upon them, but the bouncing of the round sleeping bags fastened to cartridge belts left no doubt that they were Marines.

Process During the daylight hours of 2 December was slow, since the advance of the assault units was determined by the speed with which the long column of vehicles could move. The engineers, now under the command of TSgt Edwin Knox, (Lt Richards had been badly wounded and sent to the aid station during the night) utilized their only remaining bulldozer to clear Chinese roadblocks as quickly as possible.

By midafternoon, the composite company, advancing along the MSR between G and H Cos, ran into a serious situation. The Chinese had destroyed a small bridge over a deep stream bed, had blown part of the road, and had defended the roadblock with well emplaced machine guns and supporting infantry. It was impossible for the engineers to begin repair.

Once more the column halted abruptly. George Co was directed to attack down the long spur above the

Chinese, and the composite company started to maneuver in the defilade below the MSR to outflank the enemy.

Within minutes after a call went out, Lts Greene and Corby, 3/5's FACs, had the ever present Corsairs on target. The pilots put on an air show to behold. They came in low, hitting the enemy with everything they had, and barely skimmed the sharp ridge in the difficult pull-up at the end of their runs. When the F4Us completed their mission, the enemy machine guns had stopped firing for good, and shortly thereafter the position was overrun. But a long delay ensued as the engineers began the difficult job of constructing a bypass and repairing the bridge.

G Co on the high ground to the left and the composite company along the MSR continued to attack while available personnel in the CP and those moving on the battalion train worked with the engineers to clear the roadblock. H Co, attacking on the right across the corridor from the MSR, was pinned down in a stream bed just half-way to its objective. No air support was available since the planes were being used to reduce enemy positions holding up the main column.

1stLt Ammer, artillery liaison officer for 3/5, relayed How's request for artillery fire to Capt Pierce, S-3 for 1/11, whose guns were some 5,000 to 6,000 yards to the rear. He gave the enemy coordinates, called for a round of white phosphorus and got the word that it was "on the way." The first burst was a little over, but corrections were made and the next was right on. The order "fire for effect" was given; 36 rounds were on their way. Lt Ammer waited, but no artillery.

As it later turned out, How had been registering mortars at the same time the artillery strike was being called and it was white phosphorus mortar bursts that Lt Ammer had seen. The two WPs and the 36 HEs from 1/11 were lost in the hills of North Korea, never to be located.

Only once again in the southward trek to Hagaru did the spearheading 3/5 request and obtain an artillery mission. It was difficult to employ artillery effectively since the batteries were at great distances from the targets, the communications were poor, and the situation as well as troops' positions changed rapidly. So Darkhorse had to rely primarily on its own mortars and Marine aviation to reach out in front of its lines and strike the enemy positions.

Snow was falling as night came, but How Co moved forward again under cover of the darkness. Stopping short of the enemy position on the high ground to the front, the H Co troops organized a frontal assault. With two platoons abreast and spread over a large section of the hill, they made the charge screaming and firing from the hip.

The Chinese evidently thought that the whole Marine division was coming at them because they jumped from their positions and fired while offering only feeble resistance. How secured the position at 0230 on 3 December after suffering only five casualties. Not until dawn were they to discover their objective still lay ahead.

On the left flank, G Co had moved to the high ground southeast of Hill 1520 by nightfall of 2 December. The two platoons had been reduced to little more than two oversized squads in

the daylong fight and the company commander had been wounded and evacuated. 1stLt Camarata, the executive officer, took over until 1stLt Charlie Mize, assistant S-3 and a former commander of George Co, was ordered to reorganize the company.

The composite company had also suffered heavily in an 800 yard advance along the MSR during which it overcame several new roadblocks. By midnight the company's leading platoon had been halted by heavy enemy fire from the front and from the hill mass on their right flank, which was the H Co objective.

Spirits were sagging that night, and the will to fight, even the will to live, was fading. The weary, worn Marines were being lulled to sleep by the soft snowfall and the meager warmth of their clothing. The battalion train and the long vehicle column following 3/5 had halted. The picture for Darkhorse was not bright.

George Co returned to the MSR to reorganize and make preparations to pass through the composite company which had been badly disorganized by enemy pressure during the night. And to make matters worse, the tank which had been spearheading the move along the MSR had gone off the road and couldn't get back on.

The men were so tired that they were reluctant to move. Time was important, however, and 3/5's CO began to increase the pressure. Worn-out bodies would not remain alert unless pushed. But tempers were sharp where there was life. No one liked being disturbed. It was someone else's turn to do the dirty work, they reasoned. They needed a rest. Why should they work in the dark?

Irritated, angry voices barked up and down the line. The S-4 found a chain among the supplies and the bulldozer was brought forward to pull the tank back on the road. The chain broke once, but on the second try it was shortened, another attempt was made, and it worked. Personnel were alerted up and down the line, and by the early morning light Darkhorse began to look alive.

The newly-appointed commander of G/5 talked to the remaining personnel of his company, 45 in all, counting 11 artillerymen. "Never during the entire period in Korea did I see men look so hopeless and seem to care so little," Lt Mize recounted later. "I had to recognize their problems. G Co had been fighting for four days. They had been the last to leave Yudam-ni and had been pulled out of the lines there under fire. They had eaten very little. Frozen food was available, but these men, too busy to eat much of the time, were now too tired to stomach the frozen, unpalatable stuff. But it was a fight to live. Having fought and lived with these men for 15 months, I knew that if they were called upon to go the limit in this fight, they would do it." They did.

G/5, with attached artillerymen, was reorganized into one reinforced platoon. Lt Cahill led the infantry with the first sergeant, Don Faber, as his platoon sergeant. Lt O'Connell led the mortar section.

George Co proceeded forward and passed through the composite company. How Co on the ridge to the right had discovered that they had taken only the first knoll of the hill and that their real objective still lay several hundred yards ahead of them. The company prepared to attack as the

enemy in the hills on both sides of the road began increasing their fire on the MSR.

From positions on the road, hundreds of Chinese were seen moving to reinforce their positions on the hill facing How Co. They came from a heavily wooded area across a saddle to the southeast. Darkhorse directed all efforts to aiding H Co in its plight, and George, in the lead on the MSR with the tank, moved quickly into firing positions.

Artillery was requested, but could not reach the target. Lt House, acting as FO as well as platoon commander displaced his 81's as far forward as possible to bring mortar fire down on the enemy. And despite the heavy overcast a hurried request was made for air. Through it all, How's skipper was kept informed of the fast-developing situation and of the request for air support.

Darkhorse needed help to call its shots. To lift the overcast more was needed than the science and skill of the Marines. But help came and the artillery liaison officer was heard to yell in an excited and grateful voice, "I got them! I got them!" There was a break in the overcast and the Corsairs came zooming through and over the lines. The battalion commander called for an air strike to aid H/5, and it was a beautiful sight. The Corsairs roared in over the enemy, plastered them with napalm bombs and rockets, and made strafing runs. The Marine flyers literally smothered the Chinese with fire, knocking out all but one. How Co. Pfc E.J. Cordova got that one with his BAR and grenades. The assault was a complete success.

How's seizure of this last vital

objective completed the task assigned 3/5 three days earlier. G Co, with an additional platoon made up of H&S personnel under the command of Lt Bowman, drove rapidly down the MSR. Which ever way the enemy fled they came under deadly fire from Marine infantry weapons and from Marine aviation's strafing and bombing attacks. The darkest night of a long stay in Korea had turned into the brightest day. Morale and spirits soared.

By noon, 3/5 reached the positions at Toktong Pass occupied by 1/7 and F/7. The Marines had converged, the enemy had been routed, and the MSR had been opened. The column of vehicles for the entire force was moving. Within 24 hours, all of the personnel from the two regimental combat teams would move into Hagaru-ri and join other elements of the 1st Mar Div. From this point on, the Chinese would be unable to stop the Marines in their advance to the sea.


Darkhorse was the call sign of 3/5. This name, used in the communications network, was the one accepted by the members of 3/5 and personnel outside of the unit, and continued in use after it had served its purpose as a call sign.

The night of 27/28 Nov, the enemy was dressed in white. It was one of the few times that the enemy was seen in anything other than the usual olive-green winter clothing. Evidently, at least part of the Chinese were equipped with winter clothing which was reversible: white on one side and the usual olive green or dark tan on the other.

The Wharang platoon of Korean National Police consisted of two infantry squads and one

machinegun section. There was a Marine lieutenant in charge with Marine NCOs as squad and section leaders. The actual story of what happened on the hill that night in the machinegun position will probably never be known in that no one lived to tell it. The evidence of the dead machine gunners and Chinese, however, is a story in itself. The S-2 and the intelligence NCO counted seven dead Chinese in front of the Wharang machinegun position the following morning.

All forward observer teams had previously become casualties. Their equipment either had been destroyed or turned over to infantry units before this time.



I hope you enjoyed this story. I think it one of the best reports on the action at Chosin. We have a few more oldies around.

Back now to Bob Hall's Letters From Korea.

LETTERS FROM KOREA

**North of the 38th, Korea
July 8, 1951**

I will write again tonight, Glenn's birthday, since I have plenty of time. We have a good deal of spare time because the dump is rapidly being depleted. We spend a lot of time on the telephone maintaining contact with the two forward dumps. Our dump is almost closed out. Only the captain and five or six men remain here. We do keep the records, that is, consolidate the reports from the other dumps and send them to division headquarters. When ammo supplies reach an established level, we replace them by writing requisitions and securing the necessary trucks. Today, for instance, we sent 69 truckloads to one dump and one to the other.

We now have a radio and can pick up Peking, Moscow, the Philippines, etc. It seems strange to listen to these propaganda programs and hear prisoners of war condemn our country for bombing helpless people, churches, schools, etc., and towns of no military significance. We do enjoy hearing the legitimate news, ball scores, and the like. We're all awaiting the outcome of the forthcoming peace conference and hope something positive and permanent results from it.

Classes A and C of the reserves, who were called up before August 15, are scheduled to return on July 25. At that rate I will probably miss the August 25th group, if there is one, and provided it covers the next month (to September 15), but I should be included in the September 25 draft. It will no doubt depend on the military situation in the next month or so.

It looks very much as if we will go into reserve in about a week, just where no one knows, of course, maybe Hongchon. We've been there several times already. The division is operating an extensive training schedule for all the units when they are not on line. Those men are never allowed any rest, it seems to me. We have a new training program beginning tomorrow, but I think those of us here can avoid it. There are a few lectures I would like to attend, but most of it involves the same sort of training we had back at Tent Camp 1. If it were on the subject of ammunition, I wouldn't object at all.

The weather is pleasant, considering this is now the rainy season, July and August. We've had almost no rain at all this month.

Dad, if you have a chance, look over the Henry J automobile and give me your opinion of it. Try to find out the facts because I'm sure you don't have a very high opinion of the Kaiser.

***North of the 38th, N. Korea
July 15, 1951***

It is still quiet in this area. We are going into reserve on the 19th or thereabout, which means we will move down near Hongchon again, our third or fourth time, and just sit there for who knows how long. It will undoubtedly depend on the progress of these peace talks, which were just resumed today. For a while it looked as if they had come to an end. I can't see that the presence of the correspondents was of the slightest importance, especially if it meant prolonging the war and the loss of more men.

We spend a good deal of time listening to the radio we have here. We

can get such places as New Zealand, the Philippines, India, and even Radio Peking and Radio Moscow, both of which broadcast some interesting propaganda programs. They can also be irritating. For instance, on the last Peking program we heard a captured doggie describe the bombing of Korean villages by American planes. He claimed to be ashamed of his countrymen because they had violated certain sections of the Geneva Convention and other international agreements. He was certain that the bombed villages contained no military targets. Most often hit were schools, churches, and mothers with their little children, almost too pathetic to be credible.

Another program told us about an engagement between a Chinese company and a much larger American army unit that was trying to escape one of the Chinese advances. The Chinese dug in on the rear or a flank of the army unit and, though they were repeatedly hit by fire bombs (napalm) dropped by a couple dozen American planes, they stubbornly maintained their positions and piled up American bodies by the hundreds. Their heroic stand enabled the main Chinese forces to catch up with the larger body of American troops and inflict severe damage on them, etc. The Chinese commander of the company, according to the broadcast, inspected the area after the Americans had been driven off and was filled with gratitude, inexpressible gratitude, for the heroism of his troops who, though on fire from the napalm, ran up and clung to the attacking American troops, thereby burning both themselves and the Americans to death. The commander said that in death his martyrs could only be separated from the invaders with the greatest difficulty.

Another Chinese soldier told of the rescue of a Korean baby from a burning house. "I would have done the same back home in China," he insisted. "Why would I do otherwise in Korea?" Then the announcer: "This is the way our volunteers are fighting in Korea and these are the things they are fighting for," etc. Without a doubt, quite a few of the things that are said are true, but most of it is, purely and simply, distortions or outright lies, but people like Hitler knew how effective repeated lies could be. So far as the treatment of prisoners and the wounded goes, the Chinese have probably been as humane as we, maybe even more. Every time they take a prisoner, and they have taken several thousand doggles, they put them through an intensive indoctrination course in Communism.

We heard today that a congressional committee had again criticized the way the Defense Department recalled the reserves: calling in men with ten children, for example, and calling in college students while non-veterans were given deferments from the draft. Also, it was said that the inactives were called in sooner in most cases than the active reserves, who are supposed to get their marching orders first because, theoretically, they are in a better state of readiness. The best policy, they said, would be to discharge all the inactives as soon as possible. Music to my ears! A few men are being sent back on a reserve draft, but so few that probably no one in this company will be affected.

We are getting more beer right now than we know what to do with. I have four cases under my cot at present, not all mine of course, just in case they are not so liberal with it later on...

We're just sitting here waiting for something to develop. The weather has

been cool and damp. Life is easy for being in the field. How many people back home would be interested in an all expense paid trip such as this?

I suppose Don Bruns will be back anytime since the army is sending back 30,000 men per month. The Marines have 20 percent as many casualties as the army, so at that rate we should be rotating 5,000 each month but the total isn't even one third of that. We can only wait and hope. About the only consolation I have is that I am saving some money.

Our area is neat and orderly and probably the best looking one in the battalion. All our tents face a single company street.

Stones have been arranged on each side of the street and in patterns around the entrances to the tents. Pine trees have been planted in front of each tent, also in a straight line.

Today just before the major's inspection, someone took several Korean laborers across the river, dug up quite a few flowers, and planted them around the area. It did produce the desired effect even if only temporarily.

We've been on a training schedule for the past week. I try to attend any program involving ammunition. Yesterday I gave a one-hour lecture on ammunition and today one lasting two hours. It was easier than I had thought it would be. I rather enjoy talking about ammunition, fuses, and exotic items like bangalore torpedoes that we carry. As usual, when one begins to talk on the subject, answer questions, etc., he has to acknowledge how little he really knows about it. But I have come a long way since I arrived here. I'm thankful that I was assigned to the ammunition

field. I never would have thought that it would prove to be such a fascinating subject.

Bill was in this morning for a few minutes. His outfit is located quite a distance down the road. At the rate they are taking men out he may be back a couple of months before I am. We never know what will happen next but, according to current plans, it may be three months before I leave. They're trying to get the veterans out, but there just aren't enough replacements arriving even though there are plenty of men back in the states. If these truce talks accomplish nothing else, they may accelerate the rotation plan.

Right now I'm writing in our recreation tent. We keep our company recreation gear here as well as a few tables for letter writing, a radio, and a bulletin board. I wanted to write a few letters and a buddy of mine was the duty NCO here so I took his place so he could go the show. The duty NCO is always stationed here to hold chow formations, reveille, etc., as well as keep the area quiet and check men out when they leave the area. All sergeants must stand the duty NCO watch and sergeant of the guard except the three platoon sergeants and me. I'm in charge of headquarters section and the position is considered equivalent to a platoon sergeant's.

The company now has a new first sergeant, a typical old-line first sergeant with the shape of a Santa Claus and a walrus mustache and a deep below of a voice. He has brought more efficiency to the office, but he doesn't take anything off anybody. I'm in the office most of the time, but we get along well because I respect him as a person and what he represents. In the last week or so he almost chased two men

out of the office, not realizing they were officers.

No one knows how long we'll be in reserve. It all depends on how the truce talks go. As it is, we're camped by a river so we have a good place to swim and there's even a shower unit installed near the beach. We had a heavy rain a few days ago and the river rose rapidly overnight. When it rains here it pours. Our motor transport section had its trucks lined up on the wide river bank and, shortly after the downpour started, the truck drivers had to rush down and drive their trucks to higher ground. Some of the drivers didn't even have time to put their clothes on.

Lately we had a series of hot days but tonight we had another heavy shower. We are on the bank above the river and we've dug several drainage ditches so there is no real danger of flooding as there is elsewhere. The roads are covered with dust which quickly turns to mud during the rains but a few hours later the dust returns.

It's so warm that few of us have much energy. If you try to read, you're likely to fall asleep before you know it. Unless there's an activity scheduled, you can look around about three o'clock every afternoon and see almost everyone stretched on his cot sound asleep, the first sergeant included. You might think his snores would wake the dead.

The captain and Lt. Miller seldom show up at the office because nothing important is happening. All the units are drawing ammunition for training purposes from army dumps and, since we have a few men up there, we do have to compile a brief report every day. We have a couple of softball fields and two or three teams and there are

quite a few stage shows playing in the area so there is some entertainment available.

**Hongchon vicinity, Korea
August 12, 1951**

Yes, my enlistment was extended a year as Glenn's probably was. It doesn't really make much difference as long as I'm put on inactive duty. I suppose that you heard about the amendment to the \$56 billion appropriation bill for defense that provides that the unorganized reserves with one year's service in World War II must be released after a year's service in this war. My year ends on September 26. If the bill passes, and it looks favorable, I should leave here in about three weeks. At least I have something to look forward to.

Bill dropped in for awhile this afternoon. He was rather pessimistic about getting out of here. He thinks we may make another landing soon, but I tried to tell him how foolish that would be. No matter what happens, he will be leaving here soon so why worry about it.

The captain asked me to give two more lectures to the company on Tuesday and Wednesday similar to the ones I gave previously and I could only agree to do it.

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